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Efficiency of ITQs in the
Presence of Production Externalities
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National Economic Institute
Abstract  Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) are a form of property rights
that can solve the inefficiencies of open-access fisheries and generate a Pareto-
optimal market solution in a fishery. Some writers have pointed out that if there
are some production externalities in the fishery, ITQs will not be able to gener-
ate a first-best solution. In this paper, it is argued that this is incorrect. It is
proved that ITQs solve the production externalities associated with crowding, as
well as the stock externality they are primarily designed to solve. In a more gen-
eral setting, ITQs can form a basis for trade in the production externalities and
generate a first-best solution. In this case, the contracts for transfer of quotas
must include clauses that restrict further sales of quotas.
Key words  Bioeconomic model, economic efficiency, fisheries management,
individual transferable quotas, production externalities.
Introduction
It is generally acknowledged that ITQs can generate a Pareto-optimal economic effi-
ciency in a fishery (Clark 1980, 1990; Neher, Arnason and Mollett 1989). Even if
the property rights that ITQs give their holders are not as specific as the property
rights that farmers have over their livestock, these property rights suffice to generate
a first-best market solution if all markets are competitive. Some writers have pointed out
that in the presence of production externalities in fisheries, ITQs would not be able
to generate a first-best solution. They also contend that efforts to achieve a first-best
solution with taxes requires that individual firms be taxed differently. After present-
ing theoretical arguments for these conclusions, Clark (1980) contends that,
[t]here is no question that severe crowding does occur in some fisheries, but in
an open-access fishery, much of this crowding is probably largely due to the
excess entry of vessels. If the fishery were to be managed in the general vicin-
ity of optimality, using either fixed catch taxes, or allocated vessel quotas, it
seems likely that crowding externalities would largely be eliminated—although
clearly no strict conclusion of this nature is possible.
Boyce (1992) discusses the same problem and argues for the inefficiency of the
ITQs in this setting with a different model. He seems to think that production exter-
nalities cause serious problems in some fisheries.
This paper argues that these conclusions are not correct. After presenting the ba-
sic model, it discusses the special case, where the level of production externalities,
caused by a group of firms, is a function of their aggregate level of activity. It seems
likely that production externalities, in the form of crowding, can be modelled realis-
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tically by assuming that it is the sum of the activities of other firms that matters,
rather than the distribution of these activities. In this case, a uniform quota market
generating one uniform price for the quota generates a Pareto efficient solution.
The final section argues that ITQs can generate a first-best solution also in the
more general case. If the external diseconomies (or economies in the case of posi-
tive externalities) are firm-specific; i.e., if it matters for firm i if it is firm j which
increases its activities by one unit of harvest, or if it is firm k which increases its
activities by one unit of harvest, then the firms will have to add some conditions to
the contracts of transfer of quotas. These conditions will be of the type: “Firm i buys
quota from firm j and promises not to sell it to other quota holders,” and “Firm j
sells quota to firm i and promises not to buy further quotas from other quota hold-
ers.” Such contracts between a pair of firms will involve both transfer of quotas and
promises about production levels (i.e., promises about levels of externalities). In this
case, the quota prices will vary.
This is, in fact, a restatement of the Coase theorem as ITQs form property rights
that make it possible for firms to trade in production externalities (Coase 1960).
Where no property rights exist (e.g., in fisheries where there is freedom of entry
whether there is open access or a system of efficiently enforced total allowable
catch [TAC]), or where the property rights are not tradable, these contracts are not
possible, and the system will not generate a first-best solution.
The Model
The model in this paper is a continuous time model. These models provide a realis-
tic description of the biological basis of the fishery, but not such a realistic descrip-
tion of the quota setting, as no fishery will ever be organized with momentous quo-
tas. The choice of a model, however, is of no importance for the arguments in this
paper.
Let ci denote the cost of firm i. Following Clark (1980), production externalities
are expressed through cost functions. For the sake of simplicity, the cost functions
are given here in terms of harvest levels (hi) rather than effort levels. The general
form of the cost functions is:
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where N is the number of potential firms in the industry, and x is the size of the fish
stock.
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where p is the (constant) price of one unit of fish, δ  is the rate of interest, t is an
index of time, and F(x) is the growth function of the biomass.ITQs and Externalities 39
The current value Hamiltonian for this problem is:
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where λ  is the adjoint variable and indicates the social value of the natural resource.
For those firms that will participate in the industry; i.e., for those where hi > 0 is the
optimal solution, the following equation is among the necessary conditions for a
maximum:
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No Firm-specific Externalities
Production externalities, like trawlers destroying nets, or longlines and/or trawlers
destroying the habitats of some species and so destroying the fishing grounds of
some other fishing firms, are firm-specific. In such cases, it matters for the cost of
firm i if the firm which increases its effort (i.e., buys quotas), owns a trawler or a
longliner, and if the captains are reckless or not, etc. This case will be discussed be-
low, but here, the externalities will be assumed not to be firm specific; i.e., that it
does not matter for firm i which firm increases its harvest level. This seems to be a
fairly realistic assumption in the case of pure crowding. In this case, the cost func-
tion of firm i is:
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In an ITQ-system where there is an efficient quota market with uniform price (ρ ) for
quotas, firm i’s objective is to:
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where qik stands for the volume of quotas that firm i buys from (sells to, if qik < 0)
firm k, and q  is the TAC. The fisheries management authorities are assumed to take
care of the stock externality through deciding the optimal TAC (q ) and optimal
stock level (x) in each moment of time. These values are found by solving the social
planner’s problem above.
To maximize the expression in equation (9), firm i maximizes its profit π i =
phi – chh x q iii
c
ik k (, ,) − ∑ ρ  in each moment of time. The profit-maximizing con-
dition for firm i, which participates in the fishery, i.e., decides that hi > 0, is:
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where the last term comes from the fact that if firm i buys one unit of quota from
another firm in an ITQ fishery with fixed TAC, it is also buying a decrease in that
firm’s level of production. The level of production externalities from that firm will
change accordingly. Previous writers, including Clark in his excellent paper (Clark
1980) have ignored this term.
Because of equation (11) ∂∂ hh i
c
i  = –1, which makes it possible to rewrite equa-
tion (12) as:
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It is now possible to prove proposition 1.
PROPOSITION 1. If there exists a solution to the social planner’s problem in equations
(2) and (3), there are no firm-specific production externalities [i.e., equations (6)
and (7) are valid], the fisheries’ management chooses optimum TACs at each point
in time, and there is perfect competition in all markets, then the system of ITQs gener-
ates the socially optimal solution. In this case, a uniform price of quotas will be estab-
lished, and this price will induce the firms to adopt the socially optimal behavior.
PROOF: Set the quota price
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Substituting equation (13) into (12′ ) now gives:ITQs and Externalities 41
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The condition in equation (14) is exactly the same as in equation (8) in the social
planner’s problem. So, if the TAC is determined by solving the social planner’s
problem, then equation (14) guarantees that the ITQ system provides the socially
optimal result, Q.E.D.
It is easy to see from the arguments above that a tax of ρ  on each unit of harvest
will also induce the firms to choose the optimal exploitation paths. The price of quo-
tas reflects the sum of the value of the stock externality and the value of the produc-
tion externality. If the externalities are all negative (i.e., they cause diseconomies,
which means that ∂∂ ch ii
c  are all positive), then ρ  > λ .
Firm-specific Externalities
This section deals with the general case where the production externalities are firm
specific. In an ITQ system, firm i’s objective is to:
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where ρ ik is the price of one unit of quota which firm i buys from firm k, qik is the
quantity of quotas, and q  is the optimal TAC. To maximize the expression in equa-
tion (15), firm i maximizes its profit π i = phi –    chx i(, )
r
 –  ρ ik ik k
N q = ∑ 1  in each moment
of time.
It is assumed that the firms act as price-takers. As is usually the case, the wel-
fare results depend on the assumption that prices are not perceived as parametric in
the firms’ decision problems. This assumption may be unrealistic, as it is assumed
here that price is determined by the bargaining between two firms that should realize
that their bargaining tactics will affect price. It should, though, be remembered that
even if the firms are trading in production externalities through these bilateral con-
tracts on quota transfers, they are at the same time trading in fishing rights, a com-
modity which has a much wider market.
It is also necessary to assume here that the actual volumes of externalities
caused by individual vessels are independent of the quota market. If it is valuable
for other vessels to decrease the fishing of some vessel, because the captain on that
vessel is more reckless than others, then the price of that vessel’s quotas depends onDanielsson 42
the captain’s recklessness, encouraging that behavior. It must be assumed here that
this kind of behavior can be prevented by some other means.
If the contracts for transfer of quotas between a pair of firms involve condi-
tional terms on buying and selling of quotas between the firms involved and all
other firms in the fishery, then the conditions for profit-maximizing contracts be-
tween firm i and firm j are:
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As i and j are trading under the condition that they do not engage in any further
trade with other firms, then hi + hj = constant, and, therefore, ∂ hj/∂ hi = –1. Equation
(18) can then be written as:
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For firm j, the same condition is:
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In a market optimum where such contracts have been drawn up between all pairs of
firms, the effect of one additional unit of harvest of firm i must have the same effect
on the cost of all other firms as one additional unit of harvest of firm j; i.e., the fol-
lowing must be valid:
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It is now possible to prove proposition 2.
PROPOSITION 2. If there exists a solution to the social planner’s problem in equations
(2) and (3), the fishery is managed with optimal TACs in each moment of time, and
all firms act as price-takers in all markets, then the system of ITQs can generate the
socially optimal solution. To generate this solution, the contracts that the firms make
concerning selling and buying of quotas must include conditions restricting further
trade with other firms.
PROOF: Let
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Substitution from equation (21) into (18′ ) gives:ITQs and Externalities 43
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which is the same equation as (5) above.
By using equation (20), it follows directly from equations (18′ ) and (19) that:
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